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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The study of the relation between forward and spot prices has been the main topic of 
many theoretical and empirical papers. The cost-of-carry relationship links spot and forward 
prices as a non-arbitrage condition. However, the implementation of arbitrage strategies 
includes taking the underlying asset and holding it until the contract expiration date. In the 
case of electricity, this matter becomes particularly difficult to address due to the fact that the 
electricity cannot be virtually stored1. This means that the non-arbitrage approach to pricing 
derivative securities cannot be applied in the usual manner (Eydeland & Geman, 1998; 
Bessembinder & Lemmon, 2002; Lucia & Schwartz, 2002; Longstaff & Wang, 2004 and 
Pirrong & Jermakyan, 2005). 
Another general approach to price forward contracts, used in the literature as an 
alternative to the arbitrage value theory, is based on equilibrium considerations. 
Bessembinder & Lemmon, 2002 (henceforth, B-L) adopt this approach and model the 
economic determinants of market clearing forward power prices. Their model assumes that 
prices are determined by industry participants rather than outside speculators, and that power 
companies are concerned with both the mean and the variance of their profits. One of the 
implications of the model is that the forward power price is a downward biased predictor of 
the future spot price – if expected power demand is low and demand risk is moderate. 
However, the equilibrium forward premium increases when either expected demand or 
demand variance is high, because of a positive skewness in the spot power price distribution. 
Another directly testable result is that the forward risk premium (defined as the difference 
between the forward and spot price) depends negatively on the variance of the spot price 
variance and positively on the skewness of the spot price. In the second part of their paper, B-
L generally present empirical evidence on the theoretical results commented above. The data 
in their study consists of a set of spot and monthly electricity forward prices from the 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland (PJM) electricity market and from the California 
Power Exchange (CALPX). Cartea and Villaplana (2008) propose a model where wholesale 
electricity prices are explained by two state variables: demand and capacity. They apply their 
model to the PJM, England and Wales and Nord Pool markets and observe that the forward 
premium dynamics are seasonal. 
Other papers directly focus on the empirical analysis of the risk forward premium. For 
example, Shawky et al (2003) conclude non-zero premium in the California-Oregon border. 
                                                 
 
1 Though power is not storable, potential energy can be stored in the form of fuel stockpiles or water behind 
dams.   5
Lucia and Torró (2006) contrast the implications of the B-L model, specifically, the 
implication that links the risk forward premium and the volatility of the spot price using 
weekly electricity contracts from Nord Pool. These authors also show the importance of water 
reserves to explain the dynamics of the premium through a VAR model. Ullrich (2007) 
proposes an extension to the B-L model to account explicitly for constrained capacity. 
According to his results, the behaviour of the forward premium depends on whether the level 
of the expected spot price is greater or lesser than the fixed retail electricity price. Finally, 
Benth et al. (2007) provide a framework to explain the relation between the forward premium 
and the risk preferences of market players – as well as the interaction between buyers and 
sellers.  
In some studies the day-ahead electricity contract price has been chosen as the forward 
price for analysing the risk forward premium. This is the case of Geman and Vasicek (2001) 
who conclude the existence of asymmetrically positive premiums in the PJM market for the 
summer months. Without changing markets, Longstaff and Wang (2004) conduct an 
empirical analysis of the forward risk premium using hourly prices. They discover there are 
significant electricity forward premiums and that these premiums vary systematically 
throughout the day and are directly related to economic risk factors, such as the volatility of 
unexpected changes in demand, spot prices, and total revenues. They also test some of the 
empirical implications derived from the Bessembinder & Lemmon model, concluding that 
they are supported by the data. Karakatsani and Bunn (2005) determine systematic patterns in 
day-ahead forward premiums after classifying half-hourly trading periods into two 
homogeneous peak and off-peak clusters. 
This study intends to conduct an empirical analysis of the presence of risk in both ex 
ante and ex post forward premium in the Spanish electricity market. The price series database 
consists of a set of (day-ahead) spot prices and next month (NM, henceforth) forward OTC 
monthly electricity prices – whose maturity period is extended over the following month. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the empirical analysis of risk in forward 
electricity premiums by adopting not only the ex post approach but also the ex ante and so 
enabling an enriched analysis. To build the series of ex ante forward premium, we first need 
to estimate the future spot price. Consequently, another contribution of this paper is the 
proposal of an estimation model for electricity spot price. We present the fundamentals that 
explain the Spanish electricity forward risk premium, evidencing that market players trade 
forward contracts according to risk considerations. Our results also suggest that market agents 
have built into their cost structure the CO2 emission allowances prices. Moreover, we find 
support for the implications derived from the B-L model. Finally, we would like to note that 
this study analyses the forward risk premium in the Spanish electricity market for the first 
time.   6
The main results are as follows. First, the ex post NM forward premium depends on the 
unexpected variations in demand under tight market conditions, and on the unexpected 
variations in the level of hydroelectric energy capacity. Second, by estimating the proposed 
spot price model, we find two new interesting insights related to pricing in the Spanish 
electricity market. On one hand, electricity prices are linked to CO2 emission allowances 
prices. On the other hand, prices have not been affected by the new market matching rules 
introduced in the spot market in March 2006. Third, regarding the dynamics of the ex ante 
premium, we obtain the result that it varies with the expected demand in times of scarce hydro 
capacity. Fourth, as the B-L model predicts: (i) the ex post NM premium is positively related 
to the skewness of the spot price, while negatively related to the volatility of the spot price; 
and (ii) the ex ante NM forward premium depends negatively on the spot price variance, 
increases with mean demand and is initially decreasing and then increasing in demand risk. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
structure of the Spanish electricity spot market and discusses the importance of hydro energy 
capacity in the Spanish electric system. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 provides 
some insights into the theoretical background of the risk forward premium. Section 5 is 
concerned with the variables that may explain the ex post premium and tests whether the B-L 
model implications are supported by data. In section 6, we propose a regression model to 
estimate the series of expected spot prices and forecast NM spot price. In section 7, the series 
of ex ante forward premium is derived using spot price predictions from the above mentioned 
regression model, and the B-L model predictions are tested. Finally, section 8 summarizes the 
results and concludes. 
 
2.  THE SPANISH ELECTRICITY SPOT MARKET 
The Spanish electricity spot market is organized into two markets: a day-ahead market 
where participants submit offers to sell and bids to purchase electricity for delivery at any 
specified hour during the subsequent day, and an intra-day market, which is defined as an 
adjustment market in which agents may rectify their previous positions. Over the counter, 
physical bilateral contracting is also allowed– although bilateral agreements have to be 
communicated so as to facilitate the system’s technical management2. 
The day-ahead market and the intra-day market both work as uniform-price electronic 
auction markets. Prices are determined according to the marginal-price criteria. Thus, the 
                                                 
 
2 From January 2000 to December 2005, bilateral trades remained close to 1% of the total electricity traded in 
the day-ahead market.   7
intersection between both curves determines the merit-order dispatch – as well as the 
marginal price (i.e. the price for the last accepted supply bid) for each hour. 
On the 3rd March 2006 a new regulation on market matching rules came into effect3 for 
both the day-ahead and intra-day markets. It introduced a substantial variation in the amount 
of electricity that actively takes part in the price determination process. To be more specific 
about the details of this new regulation, it should be noted that, though transitorily, 
particularly until the 27th February 20074, the bids to sell and purchase electricity that are 
simultaneously submitted to the market by entities belonging to the same enterprise group (for 
delivery during the same hourly horizon) are assimilated into physical bilateral trades for the 
coincident amount of offered electricity. Thus, after this market reform, only the net position 
of each enterprise group resulting from this assimilation process, which can be either positive 
or negative, participates actively in the price determination process. 
The supply curve in electricity markets is relatively flat when demand is lower than the 
available capacity of baseload units and it increases sharply when demand exceeds such 
capacity. This is also known as the supply stack, since the different technologies used to 
generate electricity are stacked in order of increasing production variable costs. At the bottom 
are the least expensive units which include hydroelectric, renewable resources (wind, solar, 
etc.), nuclear and coal plants, while fuel oil-gas plants and CCGT plants are often at the top of 
the stack supply. 
The generation mix of the Spanish electricity system is made of renewable resources 
(26% of total capacity in 2006), hydro power (21%), CCGT (20%), coal (15%), nuclear 
(10%) and oil-gas (8%)5. Installed capacity in renewable sources has experienced a noticeable 
increase, being 268 per cent higher than ten years ago. Electricity production in 2006 was 
about 271000 GWh – produced by coal (24%), CCGT (23%), nuclear (22%), renewable 
(19%), hydropower (9%) and fuel oil/gas (2%). Figure 1 below depicts the monthly evolution 
of electricity generation in the Spanish electricity wholesale market from 2000 to 2006 – by 
technology type.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, demand has shown a noticeable growth over the 
displayed period. It is also remarkable that the evolution of hydroelectricity seems to be 
opposite to that of fuel-oil gas, coal-fired, and CCGT-based production. This visual inspection 
is confirmed by correlation coefficients between hydroelectric and fuel oil-gas production of -
0.36, hydroelectric and coal-fired production of -0.43, and hydroelectric and CCGT of -0.54. 
                                                 
 
3 Royal Decree-Law 3/2006. 
4 This is the date when Ministerial Order ITC/400/2007 regulating bilateral trading for distributors came into 
force. 
5 Data source: 2006 annual report (REE). www.ree.es   8
This fact reveals that hydro technology could play a significant role in spot price formation, 
since it can meet the demand for electricity by substituting more expensive technologies.  
Figure 1. Electricity production by technology type in the Spanish (day ahead) spot market 












Renewable Nuclear Hydroelectric Coal CCGT Fuel oil-gas  
Data source: OMEL. 
Therefore, the greater the availability of hydro energy, the lower the need for high 
production variable cost units to be dispatched. Consequently, in absence of market power, 
low (high) prices should be expected in situations of plentiful (scarce) hydro capacity, and, in 
that sense, this variable could be used as a proxy for Spanish supply market conditions.   
 
3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
The primary data for this study consists of monthly average OTC forward and spot 
prices from the Spanish electricity market.  
The forward data set includes the business day prices for power to be delivered during 
24 hours a day for the next month. Therefore, dealing in an NM contract in January means 
trading the electricity to be delivered over the 24 hours of every day in February. The spot 
reference price used for settlement at maturity is the arithmetic mean of day-ahead hourly 
prices over 24 hours of the day.  
As an example, Figure 2 graphs the daily evolution of NM forward prices from 1
st 
August 2005 to 31
st January 2006. As it may be noticed, only one maturity can be traded each 
month. Forward databases are provided by Reuters. The data covers the period 4th February   9
2003 to 31st January 20076. A subsequent maturity monthly forward contract is traded from 
the first day of each month, so it is not possible to simultaneously negotiate more than one 
contract maturity in the same day. 
Figure 2. Evolution of the daily NM forward quotes over the trading period August 2005- 
January 2006 
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As said, the data set also includes the spot price for each of the 24 hours of each day 
from January 2000 to February 2007. Data is available at the OMEL web site (www.omel.es). 
Also included are CO2 emission allowances futures contract prices from Climate 
European Exchange (CEX). These data can be easily downloadable from the CEX website 
(http://www.europeanclimateexchange.com). As this contract has only been traded since 22
nd 
April 2005, data is available from that date onwards. The series comprises business days from 
22
nd April 2005 to 27
th February 2007. 
Finally, the data set contains monthly hydroelectric energy capacity7 figures, the series 
of actual monthly demand as well as the series of monthly expected demand figures for the 
period January 2000 to February 2007. The first series and part of the second are available at 
the Red Eléctrica de España (REE) website (www.ree.es), concretely in the annual reports in 
                                                 
 
6  Therefore, we deal with a total of 1034 observations since we have no forward price for eight (0.7% left) days 
from the overall sample period. 
7 The energy capacity or potential energy of a hydroelectric head installation during a given period of time is 
defined by REE as the maximum quantity of electrical energy which all the observed corrected inflows, limited 
to the plant capacity flow, would enable the plant to produce under the most favourable conditions.   10
the area of publications on electric system operation, while the historical data of expected 
demand has been provided to us directly by REE. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the maximum average spot price is higher than the maximum 
average forward prices, and the minimum average spot price is lower than the corresponding 
forward. This fact seems to indicate that the spot price series presents more extreme values 
than the forward price and that these extreme values are positive, according to the positive 
value of the exhibited skewness. The variability of prices is also higher for the spot price 
series as the standard deviation indicates. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the forward and spot average monthly price from the maturity 
period April 2003 through February 2007 
Prices are quoted in Euros/MWh 
 






Standard Deviation 11.74 14.02
Skewness 0.54 0.52
Kurtosis 2.15 2.49  
 
4.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FORWARD PREMIUM 
Generally speaking, the forward premium is considered in the literature as the 
equilibrium compensation for bearing spot price risk for the underlying commodity during the 
period until the maturity of the contract. In the case of electricity, price risk becomes very 
important, since spikes tend to occur quite frequently and then prices rapidly revert to normal 
levels. If there are no inventories, this is the market answer to shocks in demand and/or 
supply. 
The forward premium is commonly defined under two perspectives in the studies that 
empirically analyse their existence. Thus, although some authors use the ex ante (Cartea & 
Villaplana, 2008) or both the ex ante and ex post forward premium definitions (Bessembinder 
& Lemmon, 2002; Karakatsani & Bunn, 2005), most researchers directly work with the ex 
post forward premium.   11
The ex ante forward premium is defined as the difference between the forward price and 
the expected spot price. The ex post (or realized) forward premium is computed as the 
difference between the forward price and the observed spot price. 
 Ex  ante forward premium:  ) ( ) ( T t tT T tT t tT S E F S F E FP − = − =  (1) 
   Ex post forward premium:   T tT tT S F FP − =              (2) 
where FtT denotes the electricity forward price observed on day t for delivery over month T, 
ST denotes the monthly average spot price for delivery over month T, and Et  is the expected 
value conditioned by the information available.  
Working with the ex post (or realized) premium implies assuming that the ex post 
premium can be expressed as the ex ante premium plus random noise. A relation between 
both premium definitions can be obtained by substituting the expression for FtT from (1) in 
(2). Thus, 
  T T t tT T tT S S E FP S F − + = − ) (    (3) 
According to (3), the ex post premium equals the ex ante forward premium plus a 
residual term uncorrelated with variables in the information set at time t. Therefore, working 
with the ex post premium means that prediction errors for the expected spot price (at day t) are 
assumed to be random noise, or that agents are rational in the sense that prediction errors are 
not correlated with the available information at t. 
 
5.  EX POST FORWARD PREMIUM 
5.1.  Magnitude and sign of the ex post forward premium 
The ex post forward premium is obtained as the difference between the monthly average 
(arithmetic mean) business day forward quotes for electricity to be delivered over a 
determined maturity month, and the monthly average spot price corresponding to that 
maturity month. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the ex post NM forward premium during the 
studied period covering the maturity months from March 2003 to February 2007. 
We test the presence of non-zero ex post forward premium for the electricity NM 
forward contracts. To do so, we use the following regression to obtain α, as it is the value of 
the mean forward premium, and then we test the null hypothesis, H0: α = 0, as opposed to the 
alternative H1: α ≠ 0.   12
t T tT S F ε α + = −  
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We find that the overall mean of the NM forward premium is -0.53 Euros/MWh and that 
this is not statistically significant, which a priori suggests that there is no statistical evidence 
for electricity forward premium during the studied period. However, going back to Figure 3, it 
can be observed that the difference between the forward price and the observed spot price has 
been persistently negative over the period from November 2004 to February 2006. For the 
remainder of the sampling period, there seems to be a positive mean forward premium. 
Hence, the above mentioned result, consistent with the absence of forward premium, could 
arise from the compensation of positive and negative price differences. 
To confirm this, we repeated the tests by separating the period into two sample 
subperiods: November 2004 to February 2006, and the remainder. The results are shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Unconditional test for the presence of realized forward premium in electricity forward 
prices 
t T tT S F ε α + = −  
November 2004 - February 2006 March 2003 - October 2004, and





Note: The t-statistics reported are based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimates of the 
variances   13
Thus, when we look at the results for each of the subsamples separately, we find 
evidence of significant forward premium. In particular, the mean forward premium is negative 
(-9.17 Euros/MWh), and statistically significant for the first defined sampling subperiod, 
while it is positive (3.78 Euros/MWh), and statistically significant for the second subperiod. 
In that sense, sign changing premiums have been identified in previous works. Thus, 
Longstaff & Wang (2004) find that the forward premium varies systematically throughout the 
day: that it can be both positive and negative, and is related to economic risk factors. 
Karakatsani & Bunn (2005) reveal a diurnal reversal in the sign of the forward premium. 
This, as the authors state, reflects the asymmetric positions of generators and suppliers 
towards risk and its variation within the day – and that such a variation is induced by the 
intra-day heterogeneity of plant technical characteristics and constraints, as well as aspects of 
market design. The difference in flexibility between the supply and demand sides of the 
electricity market has also been pointed out by Botterud et al. (2002).  While Benth et al. 
(2007) and Cartea & Villaplana (2008) argue that it is differences in the desire to hedge 
positions and diversify risk that explain the market risk premium and its sign. 
In particular, generators could have the ability to manage their price risk by exploiting 
various parameters, such as plant portfolio (using more or less flexible generation plants 
depending on market circumstances) and other aspects such as degree of horizontal 
integration, or even market rules (i.e. uniform pricing auction scheme). In contrast, suppliers 
without generation capacity are directly exposed to price risk and retail demand. The latter is 
quite inelastic to price in the short term and it is very complex to predict – as opposed to 
aggregated demand. Consequently, a greater demand for buying forward contracts8 could be 
expected and, ceteris paribus, this higher demand pressure would imply a relative increase in 
forward prices with respect to spot prices – and then the mean forward premium would be 
expected to be positive. It should be noted that this statement is only true under the hypothesis 
that the forward premium is determined by physical participants motivated by hedging, 
conversely to purely financial speculative positions. 
Moreover, another possible explanation for finding the sign of the forward premium to 
be different during some periods might be the possibly heterogeneous hedging needs met by 
producers, depending on the differing plant technical characteristics used to generate 
electricity. In fact, since market prices are determined using a uniform-price auction based on 
marginal price, it makes intuitive sense that units with low variable costs (eg. hydroelectic, 
nuclear, or coal-fired plants) might not be exposed to price risk as much as other operating 
plant technologies such as fuel oil-gas or combined cycle. The managers of such generating 
                                                 
 
8 The higher demand pressure is a result of both the greater quantity of demand and the higher purchase prices 
offered.    14
plants additionally have to face their fuel (oil-gas, fuel) price risk, since prices of their inputs 
are also uncertain due to the fact that these inputs belong to liberalised sectors with non-
regulated prices. Due to these considerations, it would be expected that certain generators 
have a greater incentive to engage in forward transactions in order to hedge, totally or 
partially, their positions in the spot market.  
On one hand, the difference in flexibility on the supply and demand side of the 
electricity market leaves the demand side with a higher incentive for hedging in futures 
contracts.  On the other hand, the diverse hedging needs and preferences among the different 
generating technology plants must also be taking into account. Below we examine some of 
the factors that can be generally helpful in explaining the deviation between spot and futures 
prices. 
5.2.  Discussion 
To better understand the properties of the premium included in electricity forward 
prices, we analyse whether variables such as unexpected variations in levels of hydro-energy 
capacity or unexpected variations in demand contribute to explaining the evolution of the 
premium.  
We compute the difference between the level of hydroelectric energy capacity registered 
in the maturity month (T) of the forward contract – and the level of hydroelectric energy 
capacity registered in the current month (t), as a proxy of the former. The obtained series can 
be interpreted as the unexpected variation in the level of hydro-energy capacity.  
The series of unexpected demand is similarly built by subtracting the expected demand 
for the maturity month from the actual demand registered in that maturity month. However, 
high levels of expected demand could have a null effect on price movements if they coexist 
with sufficient supply of electricity to cover demand, so we force the unexpected demand to 
be zero whenever the level of expected hydroelectric energy capacity is higher than its 
historical (monthly) mean value. 
As a robustness check on the above considerations, we regress the forward premium on 
the mentioned series of unexpected variations in hydroelectric energy capacity, and of 
unexpected positive variations in demand, whenever the level of hydroelectric energy 
capacity is low. The estimation results are shown in Table 3. 
The results confirm our intuition since the ex post forward premium reacts 
systematically to the series of unexpected variations in the mentioned factors. Thus, the 
realized forward premium decreases with unexpected variations in demand (β1<0). In fact, if 
the situation is such that the actual demand exceeds the expected demand for a determined 
maturity month under tight market conditions, then the actual spot price will probably be   15
higher than expected by agents when trading forward contracts, and this would reduce the 
forward premium. On the other hand, the realized forward premium increases with 
unexpected variations in the level of hydro-energy capacity (β2>0). Similarly, if the actual 
level of hydroelectric energy capacity is higher than expected for a given maturity month, 
then the actual spot price will probably be lower than the spot price anticipated by agents 
when trading the forward contracts – resulting in a higher forward premium. 
Table 3. Results from regression of realized forward premium on unexpected demand and on 
unexpected hydroelectric energy capacity (March 2003 – February 2007) 
 
T T T T t T hydcap un dem un S F ε β β α + + + = − exp_ exp_ 2 1 ,  
α β1 β2
Coefficient 0.005 -0.003 0.003
t-Statistic 0.002 -2.218 2.368  
Note: The t-statistics reported are based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimates of the 
variances. 
 
As previously reported, a directly testable result from the B-L model is that the forward 
premium depends negatively on the spot price variance, and positively on the non-
standardised skewness of the spot price. To test this result, we obtained the variance series 
(VAR) and the non-standardised asymmetry series (ASIM) of the daily spot price (monthly 
average of day-ahead hourly spot price observations) for each maturity month. The following 
regression is implemented: 
T T T T T t S ASIM S VAR S F ε γ β α + + + = − ) ( ) ( ,    (4) 
Results confirm B-L predictions. The coefficient for the variance of the spot price, β, is 
negative and significant, while γ is positive and also significant, which denotes that ex post 
forward premium is negatively related to the variance of spot prices – but depends positively 
on the asymmetry of spot prices. If we regress the ex post forward premium on the spot price 
variance and on the spot price skewness across seasons, we obtain the result that the forward 
premium is negatively related to the variance of the spot price in all the seasons but it is 
positively related to the skewness of the spot price only in Spring and Summer (Table 4).   16
Table 4. Regression of ex post forward premium on the variance and asymmetry of spot prices 
(March 2003 – February 2007) 




Coefficient 5.06 -0.12 4.60 44.64%
t-Statistic 3.09 -4.06 2.88
Spring
Coefficient 3.34 -0.11 9.74 73.31%
t-Statistic 3.25 -10.17 2.95
Summer
Coefficient 3.56 -0.13 7.73 52.36%
t-Statistic 1.39 -2.25 2.55
Fall
Coefficient 12.86 -0.22 3.80 74.24%
t-Statistic 5.78 -7.38 1.35
Winter
Coefficient 4.65 -0.12 0.24 0.00%
t-Statistic 1.20 -2.18 0.16  
 
Note: Regarding results reported across seasons, Spring is defined as the months March, April and May, and the 
other seasons defined similarly using consecutive three-month periods. The t-statistics reported are based on 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimates of the variances. 
 
6.  SPOT PRICE ESTIMATION 
6.1.  Spot price model 
To deal with ex ante forward premiums it is necessary to obtain the expected spot prices 
for the maturity month.  In particular, expected spot prices for the next month are needed to 
compute NM forward ex ante premiums, respectively. With that aim, we propose a model to 
infer the future spot price from available information on supply and demand. 
Because the spot price results from an auction based on marginal price, a variation in 
demand is not, in itself, sufficient to provoke a variation in price. Moreover, because there can 
be no inventory, the spot price of electricity is determined not only by the level of demand, 
but also by the total amount of supply (Ullrich, 2007). 
Our model contains information not only from demand-side but also from supply-side 
variables. As indicated above, in the Spanish system, during dry periods, the scarce water 
reserves lead to the replacement of hydroelectric generation by combined cycle and fuel oil-  17
gas electricity production. Thus, low levels of hydroelectric energy capacity can be used as an 
indicator of a situation where other (peaking) units probably need to be dispatched and if so, 
the spot price will consequently react. Other units with relatively low variable cost are nuclear 
and coal-fired plants, but their capacity remains quite stable. Therefore, we approximate the 
available supply from the least variable cost units with the level of hydroelectric energy 
capacity.  
Thus, we consider the ratio of expected demand to expected hydro-energy capacity for 
the corresponding maturity month as an explanatory variable for the future spot price. This 
variable allows us to capture the interaction between demand and supply, since the effect of 
the expected demand on price will also depend on the baseload system capacity approximated 
here with the level of hydro-energy capacity. 
In addition, as a consequence of the commitment assumed by Spain with regard to the 
greenhouse effect, an additional cost is introduced from 2005 onwards in the electricity 
generation process of those plants that emit CO2 to the atmosphere. This cost reflects the 
required inclusion of emissions prices into the cost structure of such plants. We suggest 
incorporating into the model the information on the effects of CO2 emission allowance prices 
on electricity prices. 
Also included are other variables, such as a dummy variable to distinguish the period 
prior and after the introduction of the previously commented new matching rules and eleven 
monthly seasonal dummy variables. The reason for including only eleven dummy variables, 
when there are actually twelve months, is to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
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where ln(Pt) denotes the logarithm of the monthly average spot price for the month t; 
ln(exp_demandt / hydro-capt-k) denotes the logarithm of the ratio of the expected demand to 
the last available hydro-energy capacity (namely the t-1 month, as a proxy for the expected 
hydro-energy capacity for the month “t”); the expected CO2 emission allowance price is 
approximated by the last available monthly emission price; rd3t is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 0 if t is prior to March 2006, and 1, in other cases; mkt is a dummy variable 
that refers to each month of the year, with the exception of January (the omitted month is the 
reference category, as the other coefficients must be interpreted by referring to it) and ht is the 
conditional variance of the logarithm of the monthly electricity price.   18
Table 5. Model estimation results (January 2000 – February 2007) 
t kt
k
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a0 . 0 1 (0.66)
b0 . 2 0 (0.19)
c0 . 1 8 (0.78)
 R
2 0.84
Akaike info criterion -0.76
Schwarz criterion -0.21
n8 5  
 
Note: The t-statistics reported are based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimates of the 
variances. 
 
The estimation results for the entire data set are displayed in Table 5.  Model reveals a 
satisfactory R-squared figure of 84%, signifying that much of the spot price is predictable. As 
can be seen in the estimation output, the coefficient for the ratio of the expected demand to 
the expected hydro-energy capacity is significantly positive, indicating that the electricity 
price is an increasing function of this indicator of market demand and supply conditions. The 
coefficient for the CO2 emission allowances price is also positive and significant, which 
suggests that market agents have built into their cost structure the CO2 emission allowances 
prices.  Finally, we obtain no direct effect on price of the new matching rules introduced by 
the RD-L 3/2006, as indicated by the non-significance of θ.   19
6.2.  Expected spot price 
Two alternative approaches are used in this paper to construct forecasts for the future 
spot price. First, an out-of-sample interval (March 2006 – February 2007) is chosen and then 
model coefficients are estimated using only observations from March 2003 – February 2006. 
Then, forecasts for every period of the out-of-sample interval are computed using the 
coefficients resulting from the first estimation. 
As an alternative method of proceeding, in forecast procedure 2 the estimation sample is 
extended by one observation, then the model is estimated again and a forecast for the next 
period of the out-of-sample interval is obtained. This procedure is repeated until forecasts for 
each period of the forecast sample have been computed. 
The estimation results for the estimated price are shown in Table 6. Conclusions are 
maintained and the goodness of fit is even improved according to R-squared, Akaike and 
Schwarz criteria. 
Table 6. Model estimation results (January 2000 – February 2006) 
t kt
k
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a0 . 0 1 (1.36)




Akaike info criterion -1.05
Schwarz criterion -0.49
n7 3  
 
Note: The t-statistics reported are based on heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimates of the 
variances.   20
We obtain very similar results when varying the estimation sample by including a new 
observation with the estimation procedure 2. For comparative purposes, Table 7 displays the 
estimated one-month-period spot prices using the above mentioned alternative estimation 
procedures, together with the actual spot price for the forecast period March 2006 to February 
2007. 
Table 7. Actual and Estimated NM price (March 2006 – February 2007) 
 
Actual spot price
Forecast procedure 1 Forecast procedure 2
March-06 65.00 58.55 58.55
April-06 50.15 44.67 40.60
May-06 48.84 52.45 52.32
June-06 51.49 59.75 57.50
July-06 53.94 73.82 68.77
August-06 49.13 42.14 37.93
September-06 56.52 46.41 48.97
October-06 55.25 43.78 45.05
November-06 52.54 34.46 34.96
December-06 45.12 28.18 29.26
January-07 46.66 30.35 33.67
February-07 47.97 42.23 49.34
Estimated spot price 
 
Focusing on the estimated NM spot price, both estimated prices are very close to each 
other for most of the sample months – although it seems that distances from estimated prices 
using the estimation procedure 2 and actual prices are lesser. This suggests that the estimation 
procedure 2 leads to slightly better forecasts. On the following section, because identical 
conclusions are achieved, we only present the results of computing the series of ex ante 
forward premiums with estimated prices using the estimation procedure 1.  
 
7.  EX ANTE FORWARD PREMIUM 
The ex ante forward premium is obtained as the difference between the monthly mean 
forward price and the monthly expected spot price corresponding to the maturity month. Our 
point is that the dynamics of the premium will depend on the hedging pressures from buyers 
and sellers of electricity. 
As previously commented, the difference in flexibility on the supply and demand side of 
the electricity market a priori leaves the demand side with a higher incentive for hedging in 
futures contracts. Moreover, since market prices are determined using a uniform-price auction 
based on marginal price, hedging needs met by producers might not be homogeneous. In fact,   21
units with high variable costs are expected to be exposed to a larger extent to price risk than 
those of low variable costs, and the former generally produces electricity during times of low 
hydro capacity. 
Therefore, during ‘normal market conditions’ we would expect the forward premium to 
be positive. However, expectations of tight market conditions induce the above commented 
sellers to sell forward contracts in order to reduce variability in their profits. In some 
circumstances, this downward pressure could be strong enough to generate a negative forward 
premium. This pressure reflects peak plant generators´ willingness to sell forward contracts to 
hedge their positions when they envisage that are going to be dispatched.    
To measure the expectation of tight market conditions, we employ a variable that takes 
the value of the expected demand for the maturity month of the forward contract, whenever 
the level of hydroelectric energy capacity of the current month is lower than its historical 
mean value (as a proxy of a dry month), and zero, otherwise. We regress the ex ante forward 
premium on this variable and results confirm our intuition, since we obtain a negative relation 
between the expected demand in tight market conditions and the forward premium (Table 8). 
Table 8. Results from regression of ex ante forward premium on expected demand in tight 
market conditions (March 2006 – February 2007) 
 
T T T t T tmc dem S E F ε β α + + = − ) ( exp_ ) ( 1 ,  
α β1 R
2
Coefficient 17.261 0.00 40.32%
t-Statistic 32.230 -3.67  
 




As with the ex post forward premium, we have tested the implications of the B-L model 
on the ex ante forward premium. According to the B-L model, the forward premium is 
negatively (positively) related to the spot price variance (skewness).  As shown in Table 9, 
results are partially consistent with the B-L model predictions. The ex ante forward premium 
is negatively related to the spot price variance, as indicated by the value of β and its 
associated t-statistic. However, we obtain no statistical evidence for the relation between the 
ex ante forward premium and the skewness of spot price.  
Finally, the B-L model also predicts that the ex ante forward premium should increase 
with mean demand, due to the positive asymmetry of spot price distribution. It also predicts 
that, “ceteris paribus, forward premium should be convex, initially decreasing, and then 
increasing in demand risk”. To test the previous statement, we estimate the following 
regression:   22
T T T T T t T load VAR load DESV load S F ε α α α α + + + + = − ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 0 ,              (8) 
where FT,t denotes monthly mean forward quote in month t for delivery over month T, ST 
denotes mean expected spot price for delivery over month T, loadT denotes spot market 
monthly mean load during month T, and desv(load)T and VAR(load)T respectively denote the 
standard deviation and the variance of the spot market daily load over month T. 
Table 9. Regression of ex ante forward premium on the variance and asymmetry of spot prices 
(March 2006 – February 2007) 
 
T T T T T t S ASIM S VAR S E F ε γ β α + + + = − ) ( ) ( ) ( ,  
αβγ R
2
Coefficient 12.61 -0.19 6.30 44.30%
t-Statistic 2.64 -7.18 1.14  




As shown in Table 10, results are consistent with the B-L model predictions as the ex 
ante NM forward premium is positively related to the mean and the variance of load, and 
negatively related to the standard deviation of load – as indicated by the values of α1, α2 and 
α3 and their associated t-statistics. 
Table 10. Regression of ex ante forward premium on mean demand, standard deviation of 
demand and variance of demand (March 2006 – February 2007) 
 
T T T T T t T load VAR load DESV load S F ε α α α α + + + + = − ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 0 ,  
α0 α1 α2 α3
Coefficient -47.581820 0.007275 0.000004 -0.026155
t-Statistic -1.898 4.694 3.912 -3.842368  






8.  CONCLUSIONS  
In this work, we focus on the study of the premium embedded in monthly forward prices 
(concretely, forward contracts for delivery during the next month) in the Spanish electricity 
market. Some remarkable results emerge from the analysis: (i) We find that the magnitude 
and the sign of the realized forward premium depend on unexpected variations in demand and   23
on unexpected variations in the level of hydroelectric energy capacity; (ii) We propose a spot 
price model which enables us to forecast spot price for next month in order to build a series of 
ex ante forward premium. The estimation of this model provides additional interesting 
insights such as that the statistically positive relationship between Spanish electricity spot 
prices and the CO2 emission allowances prices or that the introduction of the new market 
rules in March 2006 has had no effect on prices; (iii) Once computed the series of ex ante 
forward premium, we obtain the result that it varies with the expected demand during times of 
small hydro capacity due to the willingness of determined sellers to hedge their price risk; (iv)  
Finally, we confirm that the implications derived from the B-L theoretical model are 
supported by the data. 
Overall, the achieved results show that the participation of forward dealing agents 
responds to risk considerations. Finally, we wish to note that the presence of forward 
premiums in the Spanish market could create incentives to design financial instruments whose 
yields were indexed to the evolution of electricity prices. These assets could be integrated in 
the financial portfolios of non-electric investors, and the introduction of speculation into the 
market may help reduce the magnitude of forward risk premiums.   24
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